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1 Introduction 
SMEs experience more difficulties in accessing external finance than bigger firms due to high information asymmetries 
and low value of collateral (Binks et al. 1992). As a result, they usually resort to internal finance to fund their 
investment projects, and frequently forgo their growth opportunities when internal finance is not enough (Carpenter 
and Petersen 2002a). Since SMEs strongly contribute to value added and employment, policymakers have designed a 
variety of schemes to directly allocate public funding to SMEs, with various levels of success.1 There is a fierce 
academic debate, with uncertain conclusions (e.g., see Czarnitzki and Delanote 2015; Zúñiga Vicente et al. 2014), 
about the additionality of R&D subsidies with respect to private investments (for a recent example, see Karhunen and 
Huovari 2015). Equity-based forms of government support to SMEs, such as government-affiliated Venture Capital 
(hereafter VC) programs, show negligible (Bertoni and Tykvová 2015; Grilli and Murtinu 2014), or even negative 
(Alperovych et al. 2015) effects on several performance measures, while the (scarce) literature on debt-based 
government initiatives to support SMEs highlights their effectiveness (Decramer and Vanormelingen 2016; Huergo 
and Moreno 2014). 
In this work, we focus on a recent form of government intervention, called participative loans (hereinafter 
PLs), which is a hybrid financial instrument. Like loans, PLs have pre-determined maturity and interest payments but, 
like equity, the lender benefits from variable payments that depend on the profits (if any) of the borrower. The interest 
of PLs for entrepreneurial finance (and for this special issue) lies in the important advantages they present when 
compared to other forms of government support. From the government's perspective, PLs allow a recovery of 
government money that is, obviously, greater than that of R&D subsidies, but also greater than that of traditional loans 
because of the variable additional payment collected from successful firms, which may offset losses from unsuccessful 
ones.2 From the firm's perspective, the recipient SME faces lower interest payments before reaching the breakeven 
point with respect to loans and does not suffer from internal capital dilution that would emerge from the access to 
external equity. Despite these advantages, PLs have received virtually no attention from the entrepreneurial finance 
literature.  
                                                 
1 Governments have also developed indirect forms of support to SMEs, such as tax incentives (e.g., Busom et al. 2014) or credit 
guarantees (e.g., Kuo et al. 2011), the discussion of which is however beyond the scope of this study. 
2 Additionally, with respect to governmental VC, government agencies awarding PLs do not need to negotiate the initial price, are 
not limited by the presence of exit opportunities (which are scarce in Europe) and do not participate in the boards of directors of 
target firms. This last difference limits the hands on approach of the government in the firms’ businesses, which however seems to 
be of scarce value added (Alperovych et al. 2015). 
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We fill this gap by analyzing whether the receipt of PLs improved award-receiving SMEs’ access to external 
finance by mitigating the problems related to information asymmetries, namely adverse selection and moral hazard 
(Binks et al. 1992). We use the theoretical lenses of the certification hypothesis, proposed by Lerner (2002). The theory 
suggests that, in the absence of direct information on the quality of a firm, private investors may rely on the receipt of 
selective forms of public support from the government to identify high-quality firms. In particular, we study the 
certification effect of PLs towards commercial banks, which are the most important source of external finance for 
SMEs (Binks et al. 1992). In addition, since the extant literature suggests that several factors moderate the effectiveness 
of government intervention (Grilli and Murtinu 2015; Meuleman and De Maeseneire 2012), we also investigate under 
which conditions award-receiving SMEs benefit more from the certification effect of PLs.  
This work is interesting for the entrepreneurial finance literature because it contributes to the discussion about 
the government's ability to tackle the funding gap affecting SMEs. In fact, a limited number of contributions directly 
assess the effect of direct public financial aid on the reduction of financial constraints in supported firms (Colombo et 
al. 2013), or on their ability to access external finance (Feldman and Kelley 2006; Guerini and Quas 2015; Lerner 
1999; Meuleman and De Maeseneire 2012). These aspects deserve more attention, however, especially in the light of 
the fact that government support may crowd out, rather than encourage, external private investments (e.g., Leleux and 
Surlemont 2003). Moreover, the certification hypothesis was never tested for government loans (nor on PLs) despite 
the fact that loans are the most common form of public support for SMEs, at least in Europe (Infelise 2014).  
Our empirical analysis is based on 488 SMEs receiving PLs from a Spanish institution (Empresa Nacional de 
Innovación - ENISA) funded by the Spanish Ministry of Industry and Tourism,3 over the period 2005-2010. Tracking 
the evolution of these firms and of a matched sample of firms that did not receive PLs, we find that the former have a 
significantly higher financial debt. After ruling out alternative explanations, we attribute this effect to government 
certification towards commercial banks, which improves SMEs’ access to financial debt (+31.5%). We also find a 
stronger effect in firms that are affected by higher information asymmetries (i.e., smaller, high-technology firms) and 
a negligible effect in firms that had already benefited from the support of other government agencies. 
                                                 
3 Other governmental agencies outside Spain have used PLs and similar hybrid instruments to support SMEs. An example is the 
Boost’PME program of PLs granted by the French ISODEV agency (OECD, 2015).  
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the theoretical base and develop our 
hypotheses. In Section 3 we present the data and the methodology used to test our hypotheses. Results and robustness 
checks are shown in sections 4 and 5, respectively. Finally, in section 6 we discuss our findings and conclude our work. 
2 Theoretical base and hypotheses development 
2.1 Information asymmetry and government certification to SMEs 
Information asymmetry arises when the information about a firm is not equally accessible to all firm’s 
stakeholders (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). When there is information asymmetry between SMEs’ owners and finance 
providers, the latter have difficulties in discriminating between good and bad potential borrowers and adverse selection 
problems emerge. Commercial banks are particularly sensitive to this problem because of the limited screening skills 
they possess (Ueda 2004). After the loan is obtained, information asymmetry generates moral hazard problems by 
allowing entrepreneurs to misbehave (and gamble with the bank’s money). Both of these issues create a debt gap, 
especially in the case of small firms that have low values of collateral and reputational capital (Binks et al. 1992). 
Certification is one way in which policy makers can alleviate at least adverse selection problems in SMEs. 
Lerner (2002) argues that when the government allocates money to some selected (promising) firms, the receipt of 
public support can be used by private investors as an indication of the quality of the firm, and it is especially useful 
when direct information about it is missing. In other terms, the receipt of public support works as a stamp of approval 
of the government and certifies the value of the firm, lowering information asymmetries. 
There is some empirical evidence supporting the certification hypothesis for different forms of government 
support. Lerner (1999) shows that US Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) grants improve recipient SMEs’ 
access to private VC. Feldman and Kelley (2003, 2006) find that firms receiving grants from the Advance Technology 
Program (ATP) are better able to raise additional funds from other sources. Meuleman and De Maeseneire (2012) show 
that R&D grants exert a certification effect that increases the Belgian firms’ likelihood of raising long-term debt and, 
especially for the youngest firms, external equity finance. Guerini and Quas (2015) find that high technology firms 
that receive government-affiliated VC finance in several European countries are three times more likely to receive 
private VC than their counterparts, also because of a certification effect.  
The certification hypothesis has never been tested on government loans or on PLs. We argue that the intrinsic 
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characteristics of PLs granted by a government agency make them a potentially effective mechanism of certification, 
especially towards commercial banks. A necessary condition for the certification to be effective is that the government 
support conveys positive information about the quality of the firm to private investors (Kleer 2010). We believe this 
is the case for PLs for several reasons. First, the lender usually requests the borrower to balance the amount of the PL 
with an additional predefined capital increase. Only shareholders that strongly believe in the future of their business 
will provide additional equity, while the others will self-select out of the process of applying for a PL. SMEs may also 
attempt to raise equity capital from external investors, but only firms able to prove their quality will be able to do so.  
Second, applicants go through a selection process in which information about the firm is screened by the government 
agency to identify high-quality borrowers. An important assumption at this stage is that government’s assessments are 
independent, educated and technically sophisticated (Meuleman and De Maeseneire 2012). With respect to commercial 
banks, government agencies may have an advantage in the screening process because they centralize applications from 
a large number of applicants and may have a better understanding of the state of the art in specific technological fields. 
Moreover, the return on the investment in PLs includes a share of the profits of the borrower.4 Therefore, it is in the 
interest of the government (as lender) to be extremely selective in the award of loans because the higher the potential 
of the selected SMEs, the higher the additional payments received from successful firms.  
PLs may also reduce potential moral hazard problems between firms and commercial banks for two reasons. 
First, unlike subsidies and government-affiliated VC, the firm must pay back the PL at maturity. This imposes self-
discipline on the firm and a higher commitment to the project (Huergo et al. 2013), thus improving its reputational 
capital (Diamond 1991). Second, by requesting the borrower to undertake a capital increase, PLs offer further proof of 
shareholder commitment to the firm’s investments and align the interests of shareholders and lenders (Tirole 2006).  
Summing up, PLs may reduce adverse selection problems by certifying that award-receiving firms are of good 
quality, and reduce moral hazard problems by aligning the interests of shareholders and debt providers. Our first 
hypothesis follows: 
                                                 
4 This clause may generate misalignment between the objectives of the governmental agency awarding PLs and those of commercial 
banks. The agency may be more inclined to finance high-risk high-return projects which would not be attractive for commercial 
banks. However, the provision of additional equity capital from firms’ shareholders reduces this risk. First, the equity capital 
increases the company's liquidity, and therefore reduces its risk of default. Second, shareholders have more equity at stake, and 
therefore are less likely to take huge risks with their company. 
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Hypothesis 1: SMEs receiving a PL from a government-supported institution will improve their ability to raise 
external debt, thanks to a certification effect.  
2.2 Factors moderating the certification effect  
Since PLs reduce the problems related to information asymmetries between SMEs and commercial banks, we 
predict that the receipt of PLs will be more beneficial for SMEs that are more strongly affected by these asymmetries. 
We focus on different firm-specific factors that can affect the effectiveness of certification: the size and age of the 
SMEs, the technological level of the industry in which they operate, and whether they were previously certified from 
similar (government agencies) or different (VC) organizations. 
Size: Very small firms are typically more strongly affected by information opacity, as they are not well-known 
and often unable to provide audited financial statements (Bernanke et al. 1996). Because of the fixed costs associated 
with screening, contracting and monitoring loans, banks capture scale economies in dealing with large firms, while 
costs of information collection are exacerbated in relatively small businesses (Binks and Ennew 1996). Further, the 
use of collateral by these firms is limited by the low value of their assets (Binks et al. 1992). These circumstances 
increase the cost of debt for smaller borrowers, as proved by abundant empirical evidence (e.g., Magri 2009). The 
certification of PLs issued by the government lowers the cost of information collection that banks need to face. 
Hypothesis 2 follows: 
Hypothesis 2: The certification effect of PLs granted by a government-supported institution is stronger for SMEs that 
were smaller at the time the loan was granted. 
Age: Information asymmetries are particularly acute for recently-established firms, which lack a track record 
and are characterized by scarce visibility in the market (e.g., Hall 2002). Moreover, younger SMEs are affected by 
higher levels of uncertainty, related to both the product development and the commercialization phases (e.g., Sørensen 
and Stuart 2000). The receipt of government PLs should be particularly valuable for younger firms because it increases 
their visibility vis-a-vis commercial banks and their trustworthiness as borrowers. In fact, Meuleman and De 
Maeseneire (2012) find that the certification effect of R&D subsidies towards external equity providers is stronger for 
younger firms. In our hypothesis 3, we posit: 
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Hypothesis 3: The certification effect of PLs granted by a government-supported institution is stronger for SMEs that 
were younger at the time the loan was granted. 
Technological level: High-technology firms have technically sophisticated products, whose potential is 
especially difficult to evaluate for commercial banks (Lerner 2002). In addition, high-technology firms are particularly 
reluctant to share information about themselves, because of appropriability concerns (Teece 1986). This exacerbates 
information opacity around these firms. The use of collateral to moderate adverse selection from banks is hardly an 
option for high-technology SMEs because their assets are typically highly intangible (Carpenter and Petersen 2002b). 
Hypothesis 4 follows: 
Hypothesis 4: The certification effect of PLs granted by a government-supported institution is stronger for SMEs 
operating in high-technology sectors. 
Previous government certification: Pollock et al. (2010) show that multiple certifications by similar agents 
are redundant and have diminishing positive effects on investors' assessment of firm quality. Similarly, we expect the 
receipt of a PL to be less decisive for firms that have already received support from other government agencies, due to 
a redundancy of information. In fact, commercial banks may expect that the decision to award the SME with different 
forms of support is based on similar pieces of information and criteria. Hypothesis 5 follows: 
Hypothesis 5: The certification effect of PLs granted by a government-supported institution is weaker for SMEs that 
already received support from government-affiliated institutions. 
Previous VC certification: VC investors are known for certifying their portfolio firms at the time of the 
initial public offering (Lee and Wahal 2004). Commercial banks may be more willing to lend to firms whose value has 
been certified by the presence of a VC investor. However, there may be some redundancy of information between the 
receipt of VC and the receipt of PLs, even if the certifying agent is different in the two cases. In fact, Pollock et al. 
(2010) suggest that certifications from different actors partially mediate each other. We posit the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: The certification effect of PLs granted by a government-supported institution is weaker for VC-backed 
SMEs. 
3 Methodology and data 
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3.1 The model 
Our empirical approach aims to analyze the effect of the receipt of PLs on SMEs’ ability to raise external 
debt. We proxy this ability by the level of external debt raised by SMEs, represented by logDebti,t, which is computed 
as the logarithm of the book value of debt minus the outstanding amount of the PL if any. 5  
To test Hypothesis 1, we regress logDebti,t against a dummy variable (PLi,t) that is equal to 1 in the year in 
which a firm received its first PL and in all the following years, and 0 otherwise. We expect a positive coefficient for 
this variable. Hypotheses 2 to 6 predict that the treatment effect of the PL is moderated by firm-specific characteristics 
at the moment the loan was granted. We generate some time-invariant variables that measure those characteristics, and 
we then interact them with the dummy PLi,t to test our hypotheses 2 to 6. Hypotheses 2 and 3 predict a stronger 
certification effect for firms that were smaller and younger at the time the loan was granted. We, therefore, generate 
the variables logTotalAssetstimeofPLi and AgetimeoftPLi, respectively equal to the size (logarithm of total assets in thousand 
euros) and age of the firm in the year before the receipt of the first PL. We expect negative coefficients for the 
interactions of PLi,t with logTotalAssetstimeofPLi and AgetimeofPLi. Hypothesis 4 predicts a stronger certification effect for 
firms operating in high-technology industries. We build the variable HighTechi equal to 1 for firms operating in high-
technology industries. We anticipate a positive coefficient for the interaction of this variable with PLi,t. To test 
hypotheses 5 and 6 on the non-additionality of PLs for firms that have already received support from a government-
affiliated institution or from venture capitalists (VCs), we generate the variables PublicSupporttimeofPLi and VCtimeofPLi. 
These variables are respectively equal to 1 if the firm received support from the government or from VC investors up 
to the year prior to the receipt of the first PL. We anticipate negative coefficients for the interaction of PLi,t with 
PublicSupporttimeofPLi and VCtimeofPLi. 
We include a wide set of control variables commonly used in the literature on capital structure. As the 
literature predicts a positive relationship between debt and size (Titman and Wessels 1988), we control for the size of 
the firm measured as the logarithm of total assets (logTotalAssetsi,t-1). Total asset growth (TotalAssetGrowthi,t-1), 
measured as the difference between logTotalAssetsi,t-1 and logTotalAssetsi,t-2, is included to account for the growth 
                                                 
5 There are two main reasons why we opted for an absolute measure of debt instead of a relative measure (such as debt on total 
assets). First, debt on total assets is by definition constrained to be between 0 and 100% and undervalues increases in debt when the 
equity amount is high. Second, all relative measures of debt (debt on total assets or debt on equity) also depend on equity. However, 
firms that received PLs are requested to increase their equity capital. Therefore, we believe that an absolute measure of debt is best 
suited for our study. Nevertheless, when we replace logDebti,t with those relative measures the results, which are available from the 
authors upon request, are similar to those reported in section 4. 
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opportunities of the firm (Michaelas et al. 1999). We control for the share of tangible assets on total assets (Tangiblesi,t-
1) because tangible assets can be pledged as collateral and are typically positively related to debt (Myers and Majluf 
1984). Profitability also affects debt (see, e.g., Sogorb-Mira, 2005). We measure the firm’s profitability (Profitabilityi,t-
1) as the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization over total assets. We control for the liquidity of 
the firm (Liquidityi,t-1), measured as the cash availability divided by total assets, as more liquid firms are more likely 
to raise debt (Hall 2002). Profitabilityi,t-1 and Liquidityi,t-1 are winsorized at 1% to avoid outliers. We include the book 
value of equity in the previous year expressed in logarithm (logEquityi,t-1) because the debt capacity of a firm strongly 
depends on the level of equity (Tirole 2006). We control for the receipt of support from another government-affiliated 
institution or from VCs with two dummies. PublicSupporti,t-1 is the lag of a dummy equal to 1 in the year in which a 
firm received its first form of public support and in all the following years, and 0 otherwise. VCi,t-1 is the lag of a 
dummy equal to 1 in the year in which a firm received its first VC round and in all the following years, and 0 otherwise. 
Lastly, in the model, we also include the firm age, measured in years since foundation (Agei,t), and year fixed effects.  
The literature has found that most of the variability in the capital structure is driven by an unobserved time-
invariant effect (Lemmon et al. 2008). Therefore, fixed effects estimators are better suited than random effects ones 
when modeling debt. Accordingly, we resort to a fixed effects panel with robust standard errors to estimate our models. 
3.2 Research setting 
The study focuses on PLs granted to SMEs by Empresa Nacional de Innovación (hereinafter, ENISA) 
between 2005 and 2010. ENISA is a public institution supported by the Spanish Ministry of Industry, Energy, and 
Tourism. It was established in 1982 to commit money to high-technology firms, typically in the form of minority 
equity stakes, with the aim of bridging the equity gap left by private VC firms. As the Spanish VC market matured, 
ENISA gradually switched from equity to other financial instruments since 1996, when the government approved 
regulation of PLs. Since 2005 ENISA has considerably increased the number of PLs granted to SMEs. 
ENISA provides PLs through three programs targeted at different categories of SMEs: high-technology (EBT 
program), high-growth (PYME program) and, since 2010, recently established SMEs (JOVENES program). The 
maturities of the PLs range from 4 to 9 years, and the repayment of the principal is delayed from 1 to up to 7 years. 
The explicit interest rate applied is floating and collateral is not required. ENISA's PLs are subordinated to any loans 
and only senior to pure equity, and are counted as equity for financial analysis purposes. To be eligible to obtain ENISA 
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loans, the applicant must be an SME (according to the official EU definition) established in Spain and not belonging 
to the real estate or financial services sectors. The applicant must raise additional equity from existing shareholders or 
external investors, which ranges from 15% to 100% of the amount of the loan asked. Applicants must then go through 
a screening process, similar to a credit scoring model that takes into account the industry, location and stage of 
development of the firm, the personal characteristics of the team, the innovativeness of the business model and its 
competitive advantage, the technical and economic feasibility of the project and historical information about past loans 
granted. The evaluation process usually lasts from four to six weeks. The rate of success of applicants in obtaining 
funding is around 50%. Firms receiving a PL are granted the amount required, albeit sometimes the requested amount 
is split into two rounds.  
In this work we analyze PLs granted by ENISA through EBT, PYME and JOVENES programs between 2005 
and 2010. As we show in Table 1, the population of these loans consists of 867 PLs awarded to 694 firms and 
amounting to 212 million Euros.   
[Insert Table 1 here] 
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3.3 Data 
We created a sample of firms that received PLs (i.e., ENISA-backed firms) by merging several sources of 
data. ENISA provided the full list of loans granted by EBT, PYME and JOVENES programs in the period analyzed, 
which included the name of the firm, the program, the amount received, the date of the receipt of the loan, the maturity 
of the loan, the year of the first repayment of principal and the amounts repaid until 2013. This information allowed 
us to estimate the amount owed to ENISA by each firm in every year. We relied on the Webcapitalriesgo database to 
obtain information on the receipt of support from other government-affiliated institutions and VC firms. 
Webcapitalriesgo is a complete database of VC investments in Spain. It is the service provider to the Spanish Private 
Equity and Venture Capital Association (ASCRI) since 2000. The database also includes the information on the receipt 
of support, in the form of subsidized loans, from CDTI and ACCIO, Spanish government-affiliated institutions.6 Lastly, 
we extracted from Orbis information on the founding date, activity sector (NACE Rev. 2), geographical location and 
accounting data of the recipient firms up to 2013. We used the firms’ NACE Rev. 2 codes to identify high-technology 
manufacturing and services using the Eurostat classification.7 We were able to find complete accounting data on 488 
firms that received 673 loans from ENISA, representing 70% of the population. Table 2 reports the distribution of 
these firms across regions, industries and foundation periods, while Table 3 describes the characteristics of the firms 
at the time the first PL was granted.  
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
In order to carry out a counterfactual analysis, we selected a control group of firms that did not receive a PL. 
The ideal control group firms would present similar characteristics to those of treated firms (Chemmanur et al. 2011; 
Croce et al. 2013; Puri and Zarutskie 2012) (i.e., ENISA-backed firms) before receiving the first PL in terms of their 
ability to raise external debt (Hypothesis 1), size (Hypothesis 2), age (Hypothesis 3), industry’s technological level 
                                                 
6 CDTI (Centro para el Desarrollo Tecnológico e Industrial, dependent on the Spanish Ministry of Industry, Energy, and Tourism) 
and ACCIO (Agencia para la Competitividad de la Empresa, dependent on the regional government of Catalonia) are the two main 
providers of subsidized loans in Spain. Other regional governments started similar initiatives only recently, namely after 2010. 
7 High-technology manufacturing industries include NACE Rev. 2 codes 21 (manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical preparations), 26 (manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products) and 30.3 manufacture of air and 
spacecraft and related machinery (NACE Rev. 2 code 30.3). High technology knowledge-intensive services include NACE Rev. 2 
codes 59 (motion picture, video and television programs production, sound recording and music publishing activities), 60 
(programming and broadcasting activities), 61 (telecommunications), 62 (computer programming, consultancy and related 
activities), 63 (information service activities) and 72 (scientific research and development) (Eurostat 2015). 
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(Hypothesis 4) and previous receipt of support from government-affiliated institutions (Hypothesis 5) and VC investors 
(Hypothesis 6). To identify the appropriate control group, we first used a random sampling to extract from Orbis 2,700 
firms operating in Spain in the same industries (i.e., same NACE rev2 code) and geographical locations as ENISA-
backed firms, founded in the same time span and with fewer than 250 employees in the period 2005-2010. We then 
merged this sample with the full list of firms that received subsidized loans granted by CDTI or ACCIO (209 firms) 
and VC financing (2,049 firms) according to Webcapitalriesgo, and for which accounting data was available in Orbis.8 
After removing duplicates and missing data, the final number of nonENISA-backed firms is 4,697. Out of this sample, 
we use a propensity score matching to identify those firms that more closely resemble the 488 ENISA-backed firms 
before the receipt of the first PL. The matching variables include our proxy for the firms’ ability to raise external debt 
(logDebti,t-1), size (logTotalAssetsi,t-1), age (Agei,t,), industry’s technological level (HighTechi,), previous receipt of 
public support (PublicSupporti,t-1) and of VC investments (VCi,t-1), along with regional, year and industry dummies. In 
order to increase the precision of the matching algorithm, we perform exact matching on the age of the firm, whenever 
we have sufficient observations. We use the propensity score to choose, for every ENISA-backed firm in the year of 
the PL, the two most similar firm-year observations (nearest neighbors) in the group of firms that did not receive PLs.9 
719 firms that never received a PL were matched with the ENISA-backed firms for at least one year. They constitute 
our control group of “twins” of the 488 ENISA-backed firms. In our dataset, we keep observations of ENISA-backed 
firms and their matched twins for the four years before the matching and all the available years after the matching. Our 
final observation period covers the years 2001 to 2013. Because of the matching procedure, the distribution of ENISA-
backed firms is not significantly different from that of control group firms across industries, regions and foundation 
periods (2(11) = 2.33, 2(16) = 8.38 and 2(3) = 1.07, respectively). The balancing of the matching with respect to the 
continuous matching variables was verified using T-tests. Variables for our final sample of ENISA-backed and control 
group firms are summarized in Table 4, while a correlation matrix is presented in Table 5.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
                                                 
8 We incorporated in our sample the entire Webcapitalriesgo database in order to have a good coverage of the 
population of firms that received support from other government-affiliated institutions or from venture capitalists in 
our sample of nonENISA-backed firms, which is required to test hypotheses 5 and 6. Although based on a smaller 
sample, results are similar if we rely purely on the Orbis database to select the control group. 
9 As robustness checks, we replicated our analysis using 1:1 and 1:3 matching algorithms, and without the exact 
matching on the age of the company. We obtain similar results to those reported in this work, which are available upon 
request. 
13 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
4 Results 
In Table 6 we present the main results of our analysis. In column I we only include control variables. In column II we 
add the main independent variable PLi,t. The positive sign of the variable is in accordance with our hypothesis 1, 
indicating that firms receiving PLs have  a significantly higher external financial debt (at the 5% confidence level). 
The effect is also economically significant: firms that received a PL from ENISA register an increase of 31.5% (e0.274-
1) in the financial debt obtained from external sources.  
In column III we test hypothesis 2 by including PLi,t*logTotalAssetstimeofPLi. The coefficient is negative and 
significant at the 1% level, as expected, supporting hypothesis 2 on a stronger increase in external financial debt for 
smaller firms. The effect is sizeable. With respect to the average ENISA-backed company, companies that were one 
standard deviation of logTotalAssetstimeofPL smaller in the year before the receipt of the first PL, registered an increase 
of external debt due to the PL that is 37.2% higher. The effect becomes negligible for companies with total assets 
higher than 6 million euros at the time the first PL was granted.  
We do not find support for hypothesis 3: the coefficient of PLi,t*AgetimeofPLi is not significant in column IV, 
suggesting that firms that received a PL when they were younger do not benefit from a stronger certification effect 
than their peers.  
In column V we find a positive coefficient (significant at the 1% level) for PLi,t*HighTechi. High-technology 
firms registered a greater external financial debt after the receipt of the PL, as predicted by hypothesis 4 (+84.6%, i.e., 
e0.536+0.078 -1). Moreover, the effect of PL on low-technology companies is negligible, as shown by the nonsignificant 
coefficient of PLi,t..  
The term PLi,t*PublicSupporttimeofPLi has a negative and significant coefficient (at the 10% level) in Column 
VI, in line with Hypothesis 5. The sum of the coefficients of PLi,t*PublicSupporttimeofPLi and PLi,t is not different from 
0 at standard significance levels, indicating that firms that already received support from government-affiliated 
institutions did not further benefit from the receipt of PLs in terms of ability to access external debt.  
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Lastly, hypothesis 6 is not confirmed because PLi,t*VCtimeofPLi is not significant in column VII. VC-backed 
firms did not benefit less from the government’s certification effect towards commercial banks. In Column VIII we 
include simultaneously all our independent variables. The results relative to that specification confirm our results and 
support hypotheses 1, 2, 4 and 5. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
5 Robustness checks  
In what follows we challenge the assumption that our results are due to a certification effect by considering some 
alternative explanations. 
Selection effects: Firms that received a PL may be different from the others because of some unobserved 
characteristics, such as quality, that also facilitate their access to external financial debt. If this is true then ENISA-
backed firms may have higher external debt, not because of a treatment effect of the PL, but solely because of selection 
effects. This alternative explanation for our results, driven by the potential endogeneity of the PL, cannot be completely 
excluded with a matching procedure, which consists of picking twins of ENISA-backed firms based only on observable 
characteristics, and may create a bias in the estimated coefficients. In order to tackle the possible PL's endogenous 
treatment, we use the Vella and Verbeek (1999) variation of the Heckman (1979)’s two-step approach. In the first step, 
we estimate a Probit model with random effects to model firms´ likelihood of receiving a PL, on the basis of all the 
variables included in our main model, together with regional and industry dummies. We also include 
ENISAavailabilityi,t, representing the total amount of PLs granted by ENISA by year and province, expressed in million 
Euros (source: ENISA). The results of this first step are reported in Column I of Table 7. Firms are more likely to 
receive a PL if they are smaller, less profitable and with fewer tangible assets but growing and with more equity capital 
or VC (all these effects are significant at least at the 10% level). Moreover, the positive and significant (at the 10% 
level) coefficient of ENISAavailabilityi,t shows that the probability of receiving a loan is higher in years and provinces 
with higher availability of PLs. We use the results of the Probit regression to compute an endogeneity correction term 
based on the Inverse Mills Ratio. In a second step, we add it in the external debt model (Column II). The correction 
term is not significant, indicating that the unobserved characteristics of firms that received PLs do not significantly 
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affect their access to external debt. Moreover, the results relative to our hypotheses 1, 2, 4 and 5 are confirmed and 
coefficients are similar to those reported in column VIII of Table 6.10 
Increased tangibility: Bester (1985) shows that an increase in the value of collateral results in an easier access to 
commercial debt. ENISA-backed firms can use PLs to acquire tangible assets that can subsequently be pledged as 
collateral. In fact, in an unreported estimate, we find that the receipt of PLs significantly increases companies’ tangible 
assets.11 Commercial banks may be more willing to lend money to ENISA-backed firms because they have higher 
tangibility (i.e., more collateral), and not because of a certification effect. In order to rule out the alternative hypothesis 
that the link between PL and access to bank loans is fully mediated by an increase of tangible assets, we augment our 
baseline model of external debt with the interaction between PLi,t and Tangiblesi,t-1. In Column III of Table 7 we show 
a negative and significant coefficient for this interaction variable. The sum of coefficients of Tangiblesi,t-1 and PLi,t * 
Tangiblesi,t-1 is not significantly different from 0 at standard significance level, indicating that the debt of companies 
that received a PL is not sensitive to the tangibility of the company’s assets. In other terms, the presence of collateral 
is not fundamental to access external debt for ENISA-backed companies. Moreover, the coefficient of PLi,t is still 
positive and significant: a certification effect is found even after controlling for the collateral effect of PLs (Colombo 
et al. 2013). Our hypotheses 1, 2, 4 and 5 are confirmed. The magnitude of the effect of PLs on external debt is however 
lower for companies with more tangibles, and becomes negligible when Tangiblesi,t-1 is higher than 0.5, i.e. the 85th 
percentile of the variable in our sample.   
 [Insert Table 7 here] 
6 Discussion and conclusion 
In this work we study the effectiveness of PLs granted by a government agency in improving recipient SMEs' 
access to external debt. PLs are hybrid financial instruments that share characteristics from traditional loans and equity. 
The lender is rewarded in two ways: a pre-determined interest rate, and a share of the firm’s profits.  
PLs are awarded selectively and often require the borrower to balance the amount of the PL with a predefined 
capital increase. High-quality SMEs are more likely to be able to raise the additional capital and successfully pass 
                                                 
10 Results are also robust when using the 2SLS-IV approach (Angrist et al. 1996) as an alternative control for endogeneity. 
11 In particular, we estimate the impact of PLi,t on Tangiblesi,t using a fixed effects model and considering the same set of control 
variables used in the main analysis. Results are available upon request. 
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through the government’s screening process. Therefore, receipt of PLs can be seen by external investors, especially 
commercial banks, as an indication of the SMEs’ quality. This is a necessary condition for a certification effect to be 
in place (Kleer 2010). The certification hypothesis (Lerner 2002) predicts that the receipt of selective forms of public 
support reduces information asymmetries around firms’ quality and limits adverse selection problems, improving 
firms’ access to external finance. While this hypothesis was tested on R&D subsidies (Feldman and Kelley 2006; 
Lerner 1999; Meuleman and De Maeseneire 2012) and Government VC (Guerini and Quas 2015), we test it for the 
first time on PLs. We argue that the receipt of PLs may also reduce moral hazard problems between SMEs and 
commercial banks. PLs align SMEs and lenders’ interests by requiring the lender to commit additional capital. 
We test our hypotheses on a sample of 488 firms receiving PLs from a Spanish government agency (ENISA) 
between 2005 and 2010 and a control group of 719 peers. We find that SMEs receiving PLs have significantly higher 
financial debt (+31.5%), well beyond the value of the loan itself. The effect is driven by firms operating in high-
technology sectors and small firms (i.e., less than 6 million euros of total assets at the moment of the receipt of the 
PL), which are characterized by higher information asymmetries. In contrast, we do not find a significant effect on 
younger firms, probably because ENISA-backed firms were all very young at the time the loan was granted (70% and 
85% of them were, respectively, less than 5 and 10 years old). The certification effect is not significant for firms that 
had previously received government support and whose quality was arguably already certified by another government 
agency. On the contrary, we do not find that firms that received VC (also a certifying body) were less affected by the 
receipt of PLs. One possible explanation for this result is that the information conveyed by VC and the government is 
not redundant in the eye of commercial banks, provided that it comes from totally different sources. Lastly, the effect 
of PLs is stronger for companies with fewer tangible assets, i.e. lower values of collateral. 
This work contributes to the literature on entrepreneurial finance in several ways. First, by focusing on hybrid 
financial instruments, which have only recently attracted the interest of policymakers (OECD 2015), we extend the 
existing literature on the different forms of government support to young and innovative firms (North et al. 2001). 
Second, we complement the existing evidence on the certification effect of government support towards external 
investors by studying under which conditions the effect is stronger, thus expanding the study of Meuleman and De 
Maeseneire (2012). Third, we contribute to the existing evidence on the impact of policy measures undertaken by 
public authorities to fill the funding gap in SMEs. While other researchers have found that the receipt of government 
support reduces the financial constraints of award-receiving firms (e.g., Colombo et al. 2013), this work provides more 
17 
 
details about the mechanisms through which this effect is enhanced. In particular, besides the aforementioned 
certification effect, we also find that the receipt of PLs allows firms to increase the value of their collateral, which in 
turn improves access to commercial debt. The certification effect and the collateral effect partially mediate each other. 
We believe that this paper also has interesting policy implications. In the struggle to design appropriate 
schemes to support SMEs (Colombo et al. 2014), policy makers throughout  the world have recently directed their 
attention towards hybrid instruments, which combine debt and equity features (OECD 2015). This paper supports the 
use of one of these new schemes: PLs. As a policy instrument, PLs are characterized by a lower burden than R&D 
subsidies in terms of government spending, which is a concern nowadays to reduce the government deficit, especially 
in the light of the fact that the benefits of R&D subsidies do not always cover their costs (Decramer and Vanormelingen 
2016). Furthermore, the institution granting the loans does not face as much risk as in the case of pure equity 
investments. In addition, the potential universe of firms that could take advantage of this instrument is significantly 
larger than that of VC. From the entrepreneurs’ point of view, with PLs SMEs face minimum interest payments until 
breakeven is reached, and are not affected by internal capital dilution. Moreover, we show that PLs exert a negligible 
certification effect on low-technology, medium-sized companies with sizeable tangible assets, or in companies that 
already received support from government institutions. These results may provide guidance to governmental agencies 
in the selective provision of their loans. 
ENISA clearly represents a success story that could be an inspiration for policy makers outside Spain whose 
objective is to facilitate SMEs' access to external finance. This study shows that ENISA is considered as a reputable 
certifying agency by private-sector institutions, which value and trust the screening skills of ENISA. ENISA has 
developed its reputation as a capable screener, especially in the high–technology sector, by being active in the VC 
industry for more than ten years before turning its interest to quasi-equity instruments. One important caveat for policy 
makers is, therefore, to build the reputation of the certifying agency, for instance, by relying on a recognized experience 
and success of an existing institution. 
This work presents some limitations that open avenues for future research. While we describe the potential 
advantages of PLs over R&D subsidies and government-affiliated VC, future research may offer empirical evidence 
on whether the peculiarities of PLs effectively result in a higher certification effect of SMEs towards banks than other 
types of government intervention. This type of study would be especially useful to develop interesting policy 
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implications, and is at the very top of our research agenda. Future contributions to the government certification 
literature towards commercial banks should also test whether the certification effect is stronger for short-term or long-
term debt and whether it also has an effect on the cost of debt, rather than on the amount received. Finally, it would be 
interesting to test to what extent the certification effect is affected by the self-selection condition imposed through the 
capital increase that recipient firms are required to complete.   
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Tables 
Table 1: Universe of ENISA loans belonging to the programs EBT, PYME and JOVENES 
                
Panel A. Amount of loans to firms receiving the first loan between 2005 and 2010 (in 1000 Euros) 
Program 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
EBT 5,600 12,943 10,030 16,092 17,285 17,805 79,755 
PYME 3,920 6,975 11,378 15,013 22,840 65,460 125,585 
JOVENES 0 0 0 0 0 6,597 6,597 
Total 9,520 19,918 21,408 31,105 40,125 89,862 211,937 
         
Panel B. Number of loans to firms receiving the first loan between 2005 and 2010  
Program 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
EBT 22 46 40 65 70 67 310 
PYME 12 20 31 47 76 211 397 
JOVENES 0 0 0 0 0 160 160 
Total 34 66 71 112 146 438 867 
         
Panel C. Number of firms receiving loans between 2005 and 2010  
Program 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
EBT 22 34 26 42 54 46 224 
PYME 12 16 23 35 62 163 311 
JOVENES 0 0 0 0 0 159 159 
Total 34 50 49 77 116 368 694 
Source: ENISA. 
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Table 2: Distribution of sample ENISA-backed firms by industry, region and foundation period 
  No %   No % 
Industry 
  
Region 
  
Chemicals and materials 28 5.74 Andalucía 32 6.56 
Computers, electronics, equipment 46 9.43 Aragón 15 3.07 
Other low-technology manufacturing 31 6.35 Asturias 10 2.05 
Other high-technology manufacturing 20 4.10 Baleares 6 1.23 
Trade 46 9.43 Canarias 1 0.20 
ICT 36 7.38 Cantabria 5 1.02 
Professional services 57 11.68 Castilla La Mancha 10 2.05 
Personal services 33 6.76 Castilla León 10 2.05 
Software 90 18.44 Cataluña 154 31.56 
R&D and engineering 48 9.84 Comunidad Valenciana 35 7.17 
Other low tech services 28 5.74 Extremadura 15 3.07 
Other high tech services 25 5.12 Galicia 12 2.46 
Total 488 100.00 La Rioja 2 0.41 
Foundation period   Madrid 118 24.18 
Founded before 2001 133 27.25 Murcia 10 2.05 
Founded between 2001 and 2004 117 23.98 Navarra 17 3.48 
Founded between 2005 and 2007 127 26.02 Pais Vasco 36 7.38 
Founded after 2007 111 22.75 Total 488 100.00 
Total 488 100.00    
Source: Based on data extracted from Orbis. 
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Table 3: Firm characteristics in the year of the receipt of the first participative loan 
Variable n Mean Std. Dev. Min 25th pct Median 75th pct Max 
logTotalAssetstimeofPLi 488 6.722 2.251 0.000 5.872 6.977 8.048 12.206 
AgetimeofPLi 488 6.975 8.906 0.000 2.000 4.000 9.000 57.000 
HighTechi 488 0.377 0.485 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
PublicSupporttimeofPLi 488 0.061 0.240 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
VCtimeofPLi 488 0.260 0.439 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
logTotalAssetstimeofPLi: Logarithm of the book value of total assets in th EUR one year before the receipt of the first PL. 
AgetimeofPLi: Years since the firm was established at the time of the receipt of the first PL. VCtimeofPLi: Dummy equal to 
1 if a company received its first VC round before the receipt of the first PL. PublicSupporttimeofPLi: Dummy equal to 1 
if a company received its first subsidized loan from either CDTI or ACCIO before the receipt of the first PL. 
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Table 4: Variable description 
Variable N n Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
logDebti,t 1,207 6,919 6.317 6.395 2.345 0.000 16.811 
PLi,t 1,207 6,919 0.248 0.000 0.432 0.000 1.000 
logTotalAssetsi,t-1 1,207 6,919 7.626 7.513 1.769 0.000 17.526 
TotalAssetGrowthi,t-1 1,207 6,919 0.607 0.148 1.484 -6.631 11.641 
Tangiblesi,t  1,207 6,919 0.217 0.115 0.242 0.000 0.930 
Profitabilityi,t-1 1,207 6,919 3.790 0.060 18.684 -17.528 353.681 
Liquidityi,t-1 1,207 6,919 0.155 0.078 0.189 0.000 0.931 
logEquityi,t-1 1,207 6,919 4.982 5.091 2.341 0.000 16.141 
Agei,t 1,207 6,919 9.875 7.000 9.348 1.000 59.000 
PublicSupporti,t-1 1,207 6,919 0.053 0.000 0.225 0.000 1.000 
VCi,t-1 1,207 6,919 0.267 0.000 0.443 0.000 1.000 
logDebti,t: Logarithm of the amount of financial debt in th EUR, reduced by the amount of the PL the company owes 
to the government. PLi,t: Dummy variable equal to 1 in the year in which a company received its first PL and in all the 
following years, and 0 otherwise. logTotalAssetsi,t-1: Logarithm of the book value of total assets in t in th EUR, lagged 
by one year. TotalAssetGrowthi,t-1: Difference between the logarithm of the book value of total assets in t in th EUR, 
and the logarithm of the book value of total assets in t-1 in th EUR, lagged by one year. Tangiblesi,t-1: book value of 
tangible fixed assets divided by total assets, lagged by one year. Profitabilityi,t-1: Earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization over total assets, lagged by one year. logEquityi,t-1 is the logarithm of the book value of 
equity in the previous year. Liquidityi,t-1: book value of the cash divided by total assets, lagged by one year. Agei,t: 
Years since the firm was established. VCi,t: Dummy equal to 1 in the year in which a company received its first VC 
round and in all the following years, and 0 otherwise. PublicSupporti,t: Dummy equal to 1 in the year in which a firm 
received its first subsidized loan from either CDTI or ACCIO and in all the following years, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 5: Pairwise correlation matrix of variables 
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 logDebti,t 1.00           
2 PLi,t 0.09 1.00          
3 logTotalAssetsi,t-1 0.76 0.07 1.00         
4 TotalAssetGrowthi,t-1 -0.15 -0.01 -0.22 1.00        
5 Tangiblesi,t  0.22 -0.08 0.13 -0.04 1.00       
6 Profitabilityi,t-1 0.05 0.08 0.06 -0.08 0.02 1.00      
7 logEquityi,t-1 -0.28 -0.01 -0.29 0.23 -0.26 -0.01 1.00     
8 Liquidityi,t-1 0.54 0.11 0.68 -0.15 0.17 0.16 -0.21 1.00    
9 Agei,t 0.33 -0.03 0.46 -0.31 0.08 0.04 -0.19 0.30 1.00   
10 PublicSupporti,t-1 -0.01 0.08 -0.10 -0.01 -0.12 0.01 0.07 -0.02 -0.12 1.00  
11 VCi,t-1 0.26 0.15 0.29 -0.07 0.04 0.06 -0.06 0.29 0.01 -0.10 1.00 
The correlation matrix is based on 6,919 observations. The description of variables is available in Table 4. Bold 
correlation coefficients are significant at least with p < 0.10. 
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Table 6: Analysis of firms’ financial debt: hypotheses testing 
   I   II   III   IV   V   VI   VII   VIII   
 logTotalAssetsi,t-1 0.474 *** 0.460 *** 0.447 *** 0.457 *** 0.447 *** 0.461 *** 0.459 *** 0.443 *** 
  (0.055)  (0.055)  (0.055)  (0.056)  (0.055)  (0.055)  (0.055)  (0.056)  
 TotalAssetGrowthi,t-1 0.000  0.001  0.003  0.002  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.000  
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  
 Tangiblesi,t-1 0.584 *** 0.581 *** 0.622 *** 0.587 *** 0.615 *** 0.575 *** 0.583 *** 0.633 *** 
  (0.170)  (0.170)  (0.172)  (0.171)  (0.169)  (0.170)  (0.170)  (0.171)  
 Profitabilityi,t-1 -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002  
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
 Liquidityi,t-1 -0.121  -0.107  -0.092  -0.106  -0.100  -0.115  -0.107  -0.100  
  (0.175)  (0.174)  (0.175)  (0.174)  (0.174)  (0.175)  (0.174)  (0.175)  
 logEquityi,t-1 0.049 * 0.043  0.045 * 0.044 * 0.047 * 0.043  0.044 * 0.047 * 
  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.026)  
 Agei,t 0.146 *** 0.138 *** 0.141 *** 0.139 *** 0.136 *** 0.137 *** 0.138 *** 0.135 *** 
  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.043)  
 PublicSupporti,t-1 0.171  0.163  0.134  0.159  0.186  0.267  0.168  0.299 * 
  (0.169)  (0.170)  (0.171)  (0.170)  (0.168)  (0.165)  (0.169)  (0.164)  
 VCi,t-1 0.132  0.108  0.104  0.104  0.106  0.106  0.098  0.111  
  (0.104)  (0.103)  (0.102)  (0.102)  (0.102)  (0.103)  (0.104)  (0.103)  
Hp1 PLi,t   0.274 *** 1.381 *** 0.315 *** 0.078  0.299 *** 0.256 *** 1.197 ** 
    (0.087)  (0.431)  (0.118)  (0.095)  (0.090)  (0.097)  (0.491)  
Hp2 PLi,t*logTotalAssets
timeofPL
i     -0.141 ***         -0.150 ** 
      (0.051)          (0.059)  
Hp3 PLi,t*Age
timeofPL
i       -0.004        0.009  
        (0.007)        (0.007)  
Hp4 PLi,t*HighTechi          0.536 ***     0.505 *** 
          (0.158)      (0.163)  
Hp5 PLi,t*PublicSupport
timeofPL
i           -0.388 *   -0.513 ** 
            (0.230)    (0.226)  
Hp6 PLi,t*VC
timeofPL
i             0.058  -0.018  
              (0.177)  (0.169)  
 Constant 0.556  0.730  0.759  0.734  0.832  0.739  0.731  0.857  
   (0.647)   (0.646)   (0.646)   (0.647)   (0.639)   (0.646)   (0.646)   (0.639)   
 N 6,919  6,919  6,919  6,919  6,919  6,919  6,919  6,919  
 N 1,207  1,207  1,207  1,207  1,207  1,207  1,207  1,207  
 R2 0.362  0.369  0.356  0.368  0.37  0.37  0.368  0.36  
 F 28.948 *** 29.008 *** 27.928 *** 27.752 *** 28.867 *** 27.96 *** 27.891 *** 25.117 *** 
The table reports the estimated coefficients and, in brackets, the robust standard errors of the coefficients of a Fixed effects panel data model, whose dependent 
variable is logDebti,t. The Hausman test for the appropriateness of the Random-Effects estimator was rejected with 2(20)= 296.99, significant at 1% The description 
of variables is available in Table 4. Year dummies are included in the model but omitted in the table. Significance: * p < 0.10; ** p< 0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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Table 7: Analysis of firms’ financial debt: robustness checks 
   I   II   III   
 
Model 
Probit model on 
the receipt of PLs 
RC: PLs' 
endogeneity 
RC: effect of 
collateral 
 logTotalAssetsi,t-1 -0.091 *** 0.442 *** 0.445 *** 
  (0.032)  (0.049)  (0.055)  
 TotalAssetGrowthi,t-1 0.064 *** 0.001  0.000  
  (0.020)  (0.017)  (0.016)  
 Tangiblesi,t-1 -0.556 *** 0.631 *** 0.761 *** 
  (0.189)  (0.192)  (0.175)  
 Profitabilityi,t-1 -0.079 * -0.002 * -0.002  
  (0.040)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
 Liquidityi,t-1 -0.262  -0.100  -0.106  
  (0.193)  (0.164)  (0.174)  
 logEquityi,t-1 0.115 *** 0.047  0.047 * 
  (0.028)  (0.032)  (0.026)  
 Agei,t -0.001  0.135 *** 0.134 *** 
  (0.005)  (0.047)  (0.043)  
 PublicSupporti,t-1 0.118  0.300 * 0.283 * 
  (0.166)  (0.156)  (0.165)  
 VCi,t-1 0.253 ** 0.111  0.104  
  (0.100)  (0.101)  (0.103)  
 ENISAavailabilityi,t 0.013 *     
  (0.007)      
 PL   0.009    
    (0.018)    
 PLi,t*Tangiblesi,t-1     -0.725 ** 
      (0.305)  
Hp1 PLi,t   1.181 ** 1.219 ** 
    (0.463)  (0.490)  
Hp2 PLi,t*logTotalAssets
timeofPL
i   -0.150 *** -0.132 ** 
    (0.057)  (0.060)  
Hp3 PLi,t*Age
timeofPL
i   0.009  0.010  
    (0.006)  (0.007)  
Hp4 PLi,t*HighTechi    0.504 *** 0.414 *** 
    (0.168)  (0.158)  
Hp5 PLi,t*PublicSupport
timeofPL
i   -0.513 *** -0.555 ** 
    (0.188)  (0.222)  
Hp6 PLi,t*VC
timeofPL
i   -0.018  -0.012  
    (0.176)  (0.168)  
 Constant -0.622 ** 0.856  0.832  
   (0.312)   (0.623)   (0.637)   
 N 3,942  6,919  6,919  
 N 1,096  1,207  1,207  
 R2   0.359  0.362  
 2 101.058 *** 1166.41 *** 24.386 *** 
 F     -9872.25   
 Ll -1214.4   -9877.83   6,919  
The table reports the estimated coefficients and, in brackets, the standard errors of several models. Column I shows a 
Probit model with random effects modeling the receipt of the first PL. Observations after the first receipt of the PL are 
excluded. Columns II and III show fixed effects estimators for panel data. The dependent variable is logDebti,t,. In 
Column II, standard errors are bootstrapped. Industry, region and year dummies are included. ENISAavailabilityi,t 
represents the total amount of PLs granted by ENISA by year and province, expressed in million Euros. PL is an 
endogeneity correction term based on the Inverse Mills Ratio. The description of the remaining variables is available in 
Table 4. Significance: * p < 0.10; ** p< 0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Analysis of firms’ financial debt: placebo test 
 I 
logTotalAssetsi,t-1 1.025 *** 
 (0.040)  
TotalAssetGrowthi,t-1 0.070 * 
 (0.037)  
Tangiblesi,t-1 1.410 *** 
 (0.225)  
Profitabilityi,t-1 0.001  
 (0.007)  
Liquidityi,t-1 -0.223  
 (0.273)  
logEquityi,t-1 -0.036  
 (0.030)  
Agei,t -0.009  
 (0.006)  
PublicSupporti,t 1.753 *** 
 (0.239)  
VentureCapitali,t 0.363 *** 
 (0.122)  
ENISA-backedi 0.148  
 (0.147)  
Constant -0.678  
  (1.804)   
N 5206  
N 1055  
R2 0.561  
F 39.822 *** 
LogLikelihood -1768.44  
The table reports the estimated coefficients and, in brackets, the robust standard error of the coefficients of a Between 
Effects model whose dependent variable is logDebti,t. Observations after the receipt of the participative loan are 
excluded. Year, industry and region dummies are included in the model but omitted in the table. The dummy 
ENISAbackedi is equal to 1 for ENISA-backed firms. The description of the remaining variables is available in Table 
4. Significance: * p < 0.10; ** p< 0.05; *** p<0.01.  
 
 
